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ABSTRACT: In 1916 a warlord named Oorlog – ‘war’, in Afrikaans – moved into
the Kaokoveld in the far north-west of what is now Namibia, and drove oﬀ the
original inhabitants. Shortly after, Oorlog was formally recognized as a chief by the
newly established South African administration and elevated to the highest po-
sition of power in the Kaokoveld. This article, through investigating how Oorlog
came to be elevated to this position of power, explores issues of colonial governance
and personal relationships. By focusing on the micropolitics of the Kaokoveld, it
emphasizes how interpersonal relationships – not bureaucratic structures – were of
crucial importance in the establishment and maintenance of early colonial rule in
Africa.
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IN late 1916, a small band of raiders closely pursued by a Boer commando
ﬂed across the Kunene river from Angola into the Kaokoveld in the far
north-west of what is now Namibia. Led by a warlord aptly named
Oorlog – ‘war’, in Afrikaans1 – this small band drove out the original in-
habitants and established a new base for themselves in the Kaokoveld.2
Within a year of their arrival, Oorlog had been formally recognized as a chief
by the newly established South African colonial administration and was el-
evated to the highest position of power in the Kaokoveld.
When considering the arrival and almost immediate rise to power of
Oorlog, one is left wondering how it was possible that this man, a warlord
without traditional legitimacy, could become a highly respected chief in the
* I wish to thank Michael Bollig, Casper Erichsen, Werner Hillebrecht, Giacomo
Macola, Giorgio Miescher, Lorena Rizzo, Robert Ross, Jeremy Silvester, and reviewers
for the Journal of African History for their comments and input, which greatly served to
improve this article by giving it focus and context. Author’s email : gewald@ascleiden.nl.
1 The man known as Oorlog had a number of names. In the Herero language, Oorlog is
referred to as Vita Harunga, in which ‘Vita’ is the Otjiherero word for war, and
‘Harunga’ refers to the matrilineal descent of Vita. Oorlog is also referred to as Vita Tom,
in which ‘Tom’ refers to his patrilineal descent from Tom Bechuana, his father. Here,
I use the name Oorlog, although I do on occasion use his other names when the situation
demands.
2 Today, the Kaokoveld is well known among tourists visiting Namibia as the ‘home’
of the allegedly primordial Ovahimba. On the history of the Kaokoveld and the con-
struction of the Ovahimba as ‘untouched primitives’, see M. Bollig, ‘The colonial
encapsulation of the north-western Namibian pastoral economy’, Africa, 68:4 (1998),
506–36; andM. Bollig, ‘FramingKaokoland’, inW.Hartmann, J. Silvester, and P. Hayes
(eds.), The Colonising Camera: Photographs in the Making of Namibian History (Cape
Town, 1998), 164–70.
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colonial administration. Part of the answer lies in the fact that his arrival in
the Kaokoveld coincided with the establishment of South African rule in
what had been German South West Africa. In seeking to administer and
govern this immense territory, the new administration aimed to deﬁne, for-
malize, and establish structures of control.3 However, Oorlog did not merely
become a chief because the incoming administration needed reliable agents.
As an intelligent and astute politician, he successfully manipulated the views
and attitudes of the new administration to his advantage. It was Oorlog, with
no prior right to a position of governance in the Kaokoveld, who used
the South Africa administration to legitimize his position there. To do
this, he depended upon the manner in which he presented himself, and on
the interpersonal relationships that he was able to build and develop with
individuals representing the colonial state, most importantlyMajorManning
and his successor, Major Hahn.
One of the primary characteristics often attributed to the turn from mer-
cantilism to formal colonial rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries is the replacement of interpersonal contacts with bureaucratic re-
lations in which the written directive is paramount. Thus, in theory, colonial
oﬃcials could be transferred and replaced without the system of colonial
governance changing; colonial peoples could drive oﬀ or even kill an un-
popular district commissioner, but within the logic of the bureaucratic sys-
tem every oﬃcial was replaceable, and every oﬃcial (killed or otherwise)
would, again in theory, be replaced by another oﬃcial who would then seek
to implement the policies and directives that his predecessor had failed to
establish. This article explores such issues of colonial governance and per-
sonal relationships. By focusing on the micropolitics of the Kaokoveld be-
tween 1915 and 1930, it elaborates the point, raised elsewhere by John
Lonsdale and Bruce Berman, that interpersonal relationships – not bureau-
cratic structures – were of crucial importance in the establishment and
maintenance of early colonial rule in Africa.4
In examining how interpersonal relationships came to be established and
maintained after 1915, this article complements the work of Lorena Rizzo
and contributes to a better understanding of South African rule in the
Kaokoveld between 1915 and 1930.5 In the ﬁrst two decades of South African
rule, men such as Oorlog, as Rizzo has argued, ‘beneﬁted from a process
through which power and wealth were increasingly concentrated in the
hands of a limited number of male potentates, as long as they remained on
friendly terms with the colonial state’. Later, following the bureaucratization
of South African rule in the Kaokoveld, Oorlog would be prosecuted, in
3 On the establishment and forms of South African rule in Namibia between 1915 and
1945, see P. Hayes, J. Silvester, M. Wallace, and W. Hartmann, Namibia under South
African Rule: Mobility and Containment, 1915–46 (Oxford, 1998).
4 J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, ‘Coping with the contradictions: the development of the
colonial state in Kenya, 1895–1914’, Journal of African History, 20:4 (1979), 487–505.
J. Lonsdale, ‘The conquest state of Kenya’, in J. A. de Moor and H. L. Wesseling (eds.),
Imperialism andWar: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa (Leiden, 1989), 87–120;
and J. Lonsdale, ‘The politics of conquest: the British in western Kenya, 1894–1908’,
Historical Journal, 20:4 (1977), 841–70.
5 L. Rizzo, ‘Gender and colonialism: a history of Kaoko (north-western Namibia)
between the 1870s and 1950s’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Basel, 2009).
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eﬀect for embodying a form of colonial administration that had become
obsolete.6 Yet, in the mid-1910s, Oorlog, through his own manoeuvring,
the shrewd stage management of his own image, and the cultivation of
interpersonal relations, was essential to the establishment of South African
colonial rule in the Kaokoveld.
COLONIAL RULE, CHIEFS , AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS
The defeat of German forces in colonial Namibia in 1915 was followed by an
attempt to establish South African control over the territory beyond the
‘police zone’, the region, that is, which had never been eﬀectively subjected
to German control. Administrators, mostly with various forms of South
African military experience, moved into northern Namibia and sought to
establish colonial rule between 1915 and 1920.7 This direct military admin-
istration was transformed into a nominally civilian administration, which,
following the establishment of the League of Nations mandate, governed
through indirect rule.8
Recent scholarship has stressed that indirect rule was a means of reducing
administrative costs while concomitantly acquiring local knowledge.
According to Frederick Cooper, indirect rule sought to use the ‘legitimacy
and coercive capacity of local authority to collect taxes and round up la-
bour’.9 J. C. Myers, in turn, argues that indirect rule was a ‘costuming of
political power’ that already existed but lacked legitimacy.10 Both of these
perspectives underestimate the extent to which the system and, by extension,
the workings of the colonial state, were partly dependent upon the inter-
personal relationships that local powerbrokers were able to develop with
colonial administrators. In northern Namibia, as Patricia Hayes has written,
‘representatives of the South African colonial state […] were drawn to the
Ovambo embodiments of power: that is, African power – political, religious,
social, judicial, economic – concentrated and centralised in the palaces of the
polities, embodied in the persons of their kings’. And where they were con-
fronted with ‘societies enjoying more diﬀused forms of power, such as
the decentralised western polity of Ombalantu’, headmen were invented to
satisfy the colonial administrators’ demands for a ﬁgurehead.11 In both cases,
the search for political partners revolved around the promise of a fruitful
6 L. Rizzo, ‘The elephant shooting: colonial law and indirect rule in Kaoko, north-
western Namibia, in the 1920s and 1930s’, Journal of African History, 48 :2 (2007), 264
and 266.
7 On the haphazard nature of the establishment and maintenance of South African rule
in Namibia, see R. Gordon, ‘Vagrancy, law & ‘‘shadow knowledge’’ : internal paciﬁ-
cation, 1915–1939’, in Hayes et al., Namibia, 51–76.
8 T. Emmett, Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915–1966
(Basel, 1999), 92; J. H. Serfontein, Namibia? (Randburg, 1976) 21–2. Many military
oﬃcers who had entered Namibia in 1915 (Majors Hahn, Manning, and Bowker among
them) remained as civilian administrators.
9 F. Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley, 2005),
184.
10 J. C. Myers, Indirect Rule in South Africa: Tradition, Modernity, and the Costuming
of Political Power, (Rochester, 2008), 14–18 and 25–6.
11 P. Hayes, ‘The ‘‘famine of the dams’’ : gender, labour & politics in colonial
Ovamboland, 1929–30’, in Hayes et al., Namibia, 123.
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interpersonal relationship between African powerbrokers and colonial
administrators. Oorlog may not have had the palaces of his Ovambo
counterparts, but, within the Kaokoveld, he was able to convince his colonial
counterparts that power was centralized in his person.
The manner in which travellers interpreted and dealt with the African
landscape and its peoples depended upon their own social background and
state of mind at the time of contact. Attention has been drawn to the warped
and contradictory manner in which European adventurers saw and dealt with
the peoples whom they encountered and environments through which they
travelled. 12 Although it is unlikely that Charles Manning was as ‘strung out’
as Johannes Fabian has suggested of some travellers in central Africa, his
perception of Oorlog and his relationship with him were coloured by his
own socialization and state of mind. Robert Morrell has examined the social
history of settlers and settler masculinity in colonial Natal, where Manning
was born, socialized, and educated.13 In that context, Manning would
have been conditioned to recognize strong men as the holders of political
authority; and in Oorlog, Manning found just such a man. That is, far
from being characterized by the depersonalized activities of the modern
bureaucratic state, the appointment of Oorlog was wholly dependent upon
the interpersonal relationship that he developed with Manning and his suc-
cessor. These relationships depended upon shared registers with regard to
political authority, and worked well for the early conquest phase of colonial
rule in northern Namibia, when the administration was exceptionally thin on
the ground, and armed opposition was a very real threat. Twenty years later,
when colonial rule was well established, interpersonal relationships would no
longer be essential to the functioning of the state and would be ignored with
virtual impunity by the colonial administration.
THE KAOKO AND OORLOG’S LIFE
The Kaokoveld is consistently portrayed in popular media as an untouched
wilderness whose inhabitants live in isolation.14 Yet the Himba have always
been in contact with the broader world, including the Herero of central
Namibia, with whom they are related through language, clans, and matri-
and patrilineal descent systems. Hunters, traders, and raiders from the Cape
12 Much has been written on the manner in which Africa and its inhabitants have been
viewed and ‘invented’, most notably, V. Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis,
Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge (London, 1988); K. A. Appiah, In My Father’s
House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (Oxford, 1992); and J. Fabian, Out of Our
Minds: Reason and Madness in the Exploration of Central Africa (London, 2000).
13 R. Morrell, From Boys to Gentlemen: Settler Masculinity in Colonial Natal,
1880–1920 (Pretoria, 2001).
14 D. Sauter, F. Eisner, P. Ekman, and S. Scott, ‘Cross-cultural recognition of basic
emotions through nonverbal emotional vocalizations’, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 107:6 (2010), 2408–12. Regarding the ‘discovery’ of the Kaokoveld,
see C. Wa¨rnlo¨f, ‘The ‘‘discovery’’ of the Himba: the politics of ethnographic ﬁlm mak-
ing’, Africa, 70 :2 (2000), 175–191. For a rebuttal of the PNAS article written by
Sauter et al., see J.-B. Gewald, ‘Remote but in contact with history and the world’,
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107:18 (2010), E75.
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transformed the societies of central and southern Namibia in the ﬁrst half
of the nineteenth century.15 In the 1860s, they began moving into the
Kaokoveld from central Namibia and Angola. Prior to this the Herero-
speaking populations of the Kaokoveld ‘the Himba’ had established a society
in which pastoralism was the preferred form of economy but hunting and
gathering remained important. By the 1880s, the Kaokoveld fell under cen-
tralized polities that maintained extensive links with Oorlam settlers estab-
lished at Sesfontein on the southern reaches of the Kaokoveld.16 Meanwhile,
European traders and Boer trekkers travelled throughout the Kaokoveld.
Impoverished by incessant raiding, many Himba migrated out of the
Kaokoveld to southern Angola, to seek employment with Boer and
Portuguese settlers. Those who remained in the Kaokoveld, according to
Michael Bollig, ‘dropped out of pastoralism and adopted a life of foraging in
the remote mountainous areas of western Kaokoland’.17 By the 1890s, the
Kaokoveld was largely devoid of pastoralists, with the original inhabitants
either enmeshed in the Portuguese colonial economy in southern Angola or
living as hunter-gatherers in the inaccessible mountains of the region.
With the establishment of German colonial rule in Namibia and the
change from military to civilian rule in Angola, Herero-speaking pastoralists
and pastro-foragers began returning to the Kaokoveld. These immigrants, as
Rizzo describes, ‘met an impoverished population that had just begun to
recover from decades of extended raids in the region and which was slowly
building up herds again’.18 Their process of re-pastoralization was inter-
rupted by the arrival of the Herero chief Muhona Katiti (literally, Chief
Small), who had established himself as a commando leader/warlord asso-
ciated with the Portuguese in southern Angola, and crossed over into the
Kaokoveld with his followers in 1910.19 In the absence of any eﬀective
German colonial control and beyond the reach of Portuguese colonial rule,
Muhona Katiti established himself as an independent chief in the
Kaokoveld. Here his followers engaged in pastoralism, pastro-foraging,
hunting for ivory and game products, and gardening where possible at
springs and along the Kunene river. It was into this setting that Oorlog
would soon arrive.
Oorlog was born in 1863 in Otjimbingwe in central Namibia as the son of
Tom Bechuana, a hunter who was associated with Charles John Andersson,
and Kaitundu, daughter to a sister of Manasse Tjisiseta, who would later
15 B. Lau, Namibia in Jonker Afrikaner’s Time (Windhoek, 1987). For Herero speciﬁ-
cally, see D. Henrichsen, ‘Herrschaft und Identiﬁkation im vorkolonialen
Zentralnamibia: das Herero- und Damaraland im 19. Jh. ’(unpublished PhD thesis,
University of Hamburg, 1998).
16 Oorlam communities emerged along the north-western Cape colonial frontier in the
late eighteenth century, around the institution of the Commando, and consisted of an
amalgam of Khoi community remnants, runaway slaves, Basters, Cape outlaws, and
others. See J. B. Gewald, Herero Heroes: A Socio-political History of the Herero of
Namibia, 1890–1923 (Oxford, 1999), 14.
17 Bollig, ‘Power & trade in precolonial & early colonial northern Kaokoland,
1860s–1940s’, in Hayes et al., Namibia, 175–9.
18 L. Rizzo, ‘A glance into the camera: gendered visions of historical photographs in
Kaoko (north-western Namibia)’, Gender & History, 17 :3 (2005), 702.
19 Bollig, ‘Power & trade’, 182.
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become the chief of Omaruru.20 Oorlog was born in the middle of an attack
by Nama forces on the settlement of Otjimbingwe and so his name, appro-
priately, comes from the Herero word ‘vita ’, meaning war.21
Oorlog’s youth was spent in Namibia, where he and his father had close
contact with European hunters.22 By the early 1880s, he and his father had
moved north and settled among the Boer settlers near Humpata in southern
Angola. From at least 1885 onwards, Oorlog became heavily involved
with Boer commandos, who, working on behalf of the Portuguese colonial
government, sought to gain control of southern Angola. He was directly in-
volved in at least 14 military campaigns in southern Angola and, with the
plunder obtained, was able to establish a large following. This group was
joined by refugees from the Herero–German war, and by people from as far
aﬁeld as the southern Kalahari.23 In 1914, Oorlog and his followers became
directly involved in the First World War, and assisted the Portuguese in a
successful attack on German forces at Naulila.24 In the following year,
Oorlog and his men were part of a force of 9,000 that had been mustered by
the Portuguese to attack the Kwanyama in southern Angola.25 During the
course of this campaign, in which the Portuguese forces were defeated,
Oorlog was wounded.26
In late 1915 or early 1916, Oorlog’s long-standing alliance with the
Portuguese came to an end. His followers raided cattle from a group of
people referred to as the Vale and, after a dispute regarding the distribution
of the spoils, Oorlog was declared an outlaw by the Angolan colonial ad-
ministration, a price was put on his head, and he was threatened with arrest
and incarceration in Luanda.27 Hotly pursued by a Boer commando
dispatched by the Portuguese authorities, Oorlog and his followers crossed
the Kunene river into the Kaokoveld of northern Namibia. Emissaries of the
commando followed him and warned him not to attempt to return to
Angola.28 From then onwards, Oorlog carved out a niche for himself in
the Kaokoveld and, following the visit of Major C. N. Manning, resident
20 Regarding Tom Bechuana, see C. J. Andersson, Lake Ngami: Or, Exploration and
Discoveries During Four Years’ Wanderings in the Wilds of South Western Africa (London,
1856; reprinted Cape Town, 1967). For an overview of the life and times of Manasse
Tjisiseta, see J. De Vries, That Time is Long Gone! Manasse Tjisseseta, Chief of Omaruru
Namibia 1884–1898 (Cologne, 1999).
21 The best biographical overview of Oorlog to date is E. L. P. Stals and A. Otto-
Reiner, ‘Oorlog en Vrede aan die Kunene: die verhaal van Kaptein Vita Tom
1863–1937’, unpublished manuscript (Windhoek, 1990).
22 For biographical details on these hunters, namely Frederick Green, Charles John
Andersson, and Axel Wilhelm Ericsson, see E. C. Tabler, Pioneers of South West Africa
and Ngamiland 1738–1880 (Cape Town, 1973).
23 Regarding the Herero–German war, see Gewald, Herero Heroes, ch. 5.
24 National Archives of Namibia, Windhoek (NAN), Secretary of the Protectorate
(ADM) 17, Ovamboland Administration General, Manning Native Aﬀairs Windhoek, 16
Sept. 1915, to Mr Gorges.
25 NAN, South West Africa Administration: Secretariat, A-series (SWAA) 1496,
‘Report on the tour of Ovamboland by Major Pritchard, 1915’, 21.
26 Stals and Otto-Reiner, ‘Oorlog’, 29–44.
27 Ibid. 44–5.
28 NAN, Oﬃcer Commanding Union Troops (OCT) 17, Mr Bull Brodtkorb in
Namutoni, 30 March 1917, to Col. de Jager.
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commissioner of Ovamboland in 1917, he was installed as chief, a position
that he held until his death from cancer in 1937.29 Yet, a few years before his
death, the central role that Oorlog had played within the administration of
the Kaokoveld began to come to an end. In 1935 he was convicted of perjury
and sentenced to jail in Windhoek.30 His conviction heralded a shift in the
administration of the Kaokoveld from one reliant on interpersonal relations
to a more bureaucratic form of rule.
INITIAL SOUTH AFRICAN VIEWS OF AND ATTITUDES
TOWARDS OORLOG
The ﬁrst impressions that the new South African military administration had
of Oorlog were not ﬂattering. If anything, they emphasized his and his fol-
lowers’ violent and predatory nature as they raided and pillaged their way
into the Kaokoveld. Yet it was in the face of these reports that the South
African authorities later decided to install him as chief with authority over
those whom he had raided. Shortly after Oorlog had crossed the Kunene
into northern Namibia in September 1916, a policeman stationed in Outjo
sent the following rather panicky telegram to the military authorities in
Windhoek:
Ovambos Portuguese border marching south have crossed Kunnena [Kunene]
river. Led by Chief Oorlog. Have shot seven native men one woman south of
Kunnena. All Natives well armed large number mounted. Have driven all cattle
with them and are now close [to] Zesfontein [Sesfontein] kindly instruct.31
In response, the authorities in Windhoek demanded more information and
ordered the policeman to ‘sit tight’ and not to ‘lose [his] head’.32 Subsequent
reports continued to emphasize the aggressive nature of Oorlog and his fol-
lowers; they came from western Angola, with ample stores and armed with
Portuguese Mausers, carried German bandoliers full of ammunition, were
mounted, and killed all those who sought to resist them.33 In response, the
military authorities in Windhoek ordered a small patrol, led by Lieutenant
Van Wijk, to investigate what was going on.34 Oorlog withdrew to the west-
ern Hoarusib where he established his base on the slopes of Ombuku
mountain. Indicative of the war footing in which he and his followers found
themselves, it was reported that Oorlog ‘sleeps on the top of the mountain
with his Bodyguard, only coming down to his kraal during the daytime’.35 In
addition, Oorlog and his followers had driven oﬀ the original inhabitants,
creating an eﬀective cordon sanitaire around their settlement. Van Wijk
reported that all human settlements had been abandoned along a stretch of
29 Stals and Otto-Reiner, ‘Oorlog’, 82.
30 Rizzo, ‘The elephant shooting’.
31 NAN, OCT 17, Native Unrest Zesfontein, Telegram, 1 Nov. 1916, from Outjo
military police to Windhoek sent at 4 :20 pm, arrived 4:31 pm.
32 NAN, OCT 17, WDH to Milpol Outjo, 1 Nov. 1916.
33 NAN, OCT 17, Telegram, 2 Nov. 1916, from Outjo Milpol to Windhoek.
34 NAN, OCT 17, Copy of telegram from Outjo Milpol to regcom Windhuk. Lt. Van
Wijk reports Kaross, 10 Nov. 1916.
35 NAN, OCT 17, 24 Nov. 1916, ‘Conﬁdential report on investigation native unrest
Kaokoveld’.
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17 kilometres. The speed of Oorlog’s attack is illustrated by a report from
Sergeant Botha, who had been in the area three weeks beforehand and had
assured Van Wijk that ‘all the kraals were inhabited’.36
Van Wijk’s presence did not deter Oorlog and, less than a month after
his visit, Oorlog attacked the settlement of Kaoko Otavi, killing 26 people.37
In response, the oﬃcer commanding the military detachment in Outjo
reported: ‘Have discussed matter of native unrest at Gaoko Otavi […] do not
take serious view of matter. Consider it usual tribal disturbance of minor
nature. In any case nothing can be done at present. ’38 Consequently Oorlog
continued to develop his position of power, as his followers attacked and
drove away all those who were not prepared to submit to his authority.
In February 1917, ﬁve months after Oorlog had arrived in the area, reports
arrived in Windhoek indicating that his band had attacked a settlement and
killed 36 people.39 In response, the authorities began planning a military
operation in the area.40 The military received extensive information from a
Norwegian hunter and trader who had fought with Oorlog in the Boer
commandos operating out of Humpata in Angola. H. Bull Brodtkorb’s report
warned the authorities of Oorlog’s military prowess and contained infor-
mation on his background and that of his followers: ‘Oorlog has under him a
band of ca. 150 men Hereros, Buschmann and Ovatjibas all well armed and
used to war, as they all have been police in Portuguese service, and have
run away with their guns and ammunition.’41 In other contexts and on the
ﬂimsiest of evidence, the South Africans had initiated military operations
against such perceived threats.
In February 1917, a South African expedition defeated the Ovakwanyama
King Mandume, whom the Portuguese and Oorlog and his followers had for
so long sought to conquer. The king and his warriors were overrun and,
according to oral tradition, Mandume’s head was cut oﬀ as a trophy.42 By
defeating and decapitating Mandume, the South Africans suggested that a
similar fate awaited anyone else who dared to oppose their rule. Oorlog was
informed of Mandume’s fate and the new South African administration
36 NAN, OCT 17, Ibid.
37 NAN, OCT 17, Telegram, 28 Dec. 1916, Magistrate Outjo to Windhoek.
38 NAN, OCT 17, Telegram from O/C troops in Outjo on 5 Jan. 1917, emphasis
added.
39 NAN, OCT 17, Telegram, 27 Feb. 1917, Outjo Milpol to Windhoek.
40 In the event, goods and supplies remaining from the attack on the Ovakwanyama
King Mandume were to be used. NAN, OCT 17, Telegram Windhoek to Outjo Milpol,
19 March 1917; Staﬀ Oﬃcer for Administrative Services, Ovamboland Expedition,
Otjiwarongo, 18 March 1917, to Oﬃcer Commanding Military Constabulary, Outjo; and
Staﬀ Oﬃcer for Administrative Services, Ondonga, 7 March 1917, to Transport Oﬃcer
Ondonga.
41 NAN, OCT 17, H. Bull Brodtkorb in Namutoni, 30 March 1917, to Col. de Jager,
O.C. Troops Windhoek.
42 The death of Mandume has been dealt with by a number of historians. For a detailed
account based primarily on archival research, see J. Silvester,My Heart Tells Me That I
Have Done Nothing Wrong: The Fall of Mandume (Windhoek, 1992). For the socio-
political context, see P. Hayes, ‘A history of the Ovambo of Namibia, ca. 1880–1930’,
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1992), II, 82. For a detailed eye-
witness account, see P. Hayes and D. Haipinge, ‘Healing the Land ’: Kaulinge’s History of
Kwanyama (Cologne, 1997), 86–92.
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did not mince its words: ‘Mandume’s fate should be an object lesson to
all Native Chiefs’. Oorlog was also informed that, ‘he would be allowed
to proceed to Windhuk where the administrator will give him a personal
interview’.43 Less than three months after the colonial authorities had begun
planning a military operation against him, Oorlog accepted their oﬀer and
travelled to Windhoek to meet them.44
Faced with possible decapitation, Oorlog seized the opportunity of a safe
passage to Windhoek and an interview with the South African administrator.
In early June 1917 and just four months after Mandume’s death, he arrived
in Outjo en route to Windhoek. As a gesture of goodwill, he brought along
two Angolan traders whom he had captured as they were seeking to trade
and collect debts from him and his followers.45 Placated by the gesture and
impressed by what he saw, the commanding oﬃcer in Outjo considered
himself ‘quite satisﬁed with [Oorlog’s] conduct’.46
Oorlog’s subsequent visit to Windhoek and his discussions with the
authorities there were a success. Apart from being kitted out by his hosts
in an oﬃcial South African army uniform, he also held extensive talks.47
On three separate occasions during these talks, Colonel de Jager, the com-
manding oﬃcer of the South African forces in Namibia and the man who had
personally led the attack against Mandume, brought up the fate of Mandume
and his role in the king’s demise: ‘ the Government sent me to fetch
Mandume and we fought with him […] Where is Mandume today? He is
ﬁnished!’48 At the conclusion of the discussions it was decided that an army
patrol would travel to the Kaokoveld. Colonel de Jager formally addressed
Oorlog in the third person and stated:
What I want from Oorlog is that when the patrol comes to him he must show it the
roads and where the water is to be found and so on. The oﬃcer who goes with it
will be the mouth of the Government and will come back and tell me everything.
[…] The Government has now met Oorlog and looks to him.49
In case Oorlog had not understood the string of threats implied in his ac-
counts of the demise of Mandume, de Jager stated bluntly: ‘If any one of the
patrol is injured – if so much as a hair on his head is touched by any one of
you then I will come with troops and descend on you like the rain. ’50
The man selected by Colonel de Jager to tour the Kaokoveld was Major
43 NAN, OCT 17, Oﬃce of the Oﬃcer Commanding Union Forces in Windhoek, 24
April 1917, to the Oﬃcer Commanding, Military Constabulary, Outjo.
44 NAN, OCT 17, Milpol Outjo, 1 June 1917, to Windhoek.
45 Having arrested these men and handed them over to the South African authorities,
Oorlog probably ensured that his debts to these traders no longer needed to be paid.
NAN, OCT 17, ‘Notes of an interview between Colonel de Jager, Major J. F. Herbst, and
Lieut Beckley M. Constabulary, with the Native Headman Oorlog, his younger brother
and one of Oorlog’s sons, at the oﬃce of the Oﬃcer Commanding Troops, Government
Buildings, at Windhuk, on Wednesday, the 6th of June, 1917, at 10.30 a.m.’, fo. 7.
46 NAN, OCT 17, Milpol Outjo, 1 June 1917, to Windhoek.
47 NAN, OCT 17, ‘Notes of an interview’, fo. 7; Union Defence Force, Issue Voucher
for Clothing, No. 362, 11 June 1917.
48 NAN, OCT 17, ‘Notes of an interview’, fo. 5.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. fo. 6.
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C. N. Manning, who, as resident commissioner of Ovamboland, had called
in the military expedition that had defeated and decapitated KingMandume.
ESCORTING MANNING INTO THE KAOKOVELD
Lawrence Green, the author of numerous popular history and travel books
on southern Africa between the 1930s and 1970s, referred to Manning in
vigorous terms as ‘a man among men’, a ‘short, slightly built adventurer’
with ‘an extremely virile body – correct, precise and proper to the last but-
ton’.51 Quoting an informant (probably Major ‘Cocky’ Hahn, who suc-
ceeded Manning as resident commissioner of Ovamboland), Green noted
that an outstanding trait of Manning’s was that ‘He knew natives. He had
that understanding mind, that sympathy and patience, which are the essen-
tials for the job. I considered him to be one of the best native administrators
I had ever met. ’52 A few years after the patrol with Oorlog into the Kaoko,
Manning applied for membership of the Royal Geographical Society in
London and in his letter provided some biographical details and described
his exploits in northern Namibia.53 Born in Natal, South Africa and educated
at Maritzburg College, Manning served in the South African War from 1899
to 1902, ending up as an oﬃcer commanding Zulu police in Pretoria.54 He
was then transferred to native aﬀairs and became a native commissioner in
the Transvaal. As chief clerk to the native commissioner in Pretoria he ac-
quired the nickname Fakasimbi (literally, ‘put on steel’), which referred to
his penchant for placing people in handcuﬀs. At the outbreak of the First
World War, Manning enlisted again and served as an intelligence oﬃcer
during the Boer rebellion in South Africa, before taking part in the invasion
of German South West Africa as a scouting oﬃcer.55 Following the defeat of
the German forces, Manning was sent to northern Namibia with a small
party of political oﬃcers to take control as resident commissioner of
Ovamboland, a posting that culminated in the death of King Mandume.56
Oorlog’s conduct following his visit to Windhoek suggests how he put to
use the knowledge he had acquired there. Instead of travelling directly to his
newly established base at Kaoko Otavi in the middle of the Kaokoveld, he
broke his journey in Sesfontein on its southern boundary to await the arrival
of Manning’s patrol. When Manning and his party ﬁnally arrived in
Sesfontein, Oorlog claimed that he had been unable to proceed on account of
the activities of Muhona Katiti, the Ovahimba chief who had been the most
powerful chief in the Kaoko prior to Oorlog’s invasion. Oorlog claimed that
51 L. G. Green, Lords of the Last Frontier: The Story of South West Africa and its
People of All Races (Cape Town, 1952), 75.
52 Ibid.
53 NAN, Accessions (A) 450, vol. 4, Cocky Hahn’s private papers, copy of letter written
by Manning to the Royal Geographical Society, 19 Dec. 1921.
54 Morrell, From Boys to Gentlemen, explicitly deals with Maritzburg College as an
important site for the socialization of boys and men in settler Natal.
55 At the outbreak of the First World War, large numbers of Boer soldiers and their
oﬃcers refused to take up arms against imperial Germany and many entered into open
rebellion against imperial Britain. See T. R. H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern
History (2nd edn, Johannesburg, 1978), 184–6.
56 Dictionary of South African Biography (Cape Town, 1968–87), V, 488.
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Muhona Katiti had been occupying the passes that led into the Kaoko and
that, anxious to avoid any clashes, he had decided to remain in Sesfontein to
await the arrival of Manning’s patrol. Manning never bothered to check
whether or not Oorlog’s account was true. Instead, in the nine days that the
patrol rested in Sesfontein, Manning came to rely increasingly on Oorlog,
who found men to assist the South Africans in their reconstruction of the
dilapidated former German garrison. By assisting Manning, Oorlog dis-
played his willingness to cooperate with the new administration and, perhaps
more importantly, indicated to one and all in the Kaoko that he was now
allied to the South Africans.57
The provision of South African uniforms to Oorlog and his lieutenants
served to underscore their alliance with the South African military; clothed
in the same uniform, they stood with the new power in the Kaokoveld. In
part, it was the ephemeral quality of being ‘civilized’, as opposed to being
‘savage’, that served to ensure South African support. In a later report,
South African oﬃcials described the diﬀerence between Oorlog’s followers
and other inhabitants of the Kaokoveld:
They appear to have the speech and customs of the Herrero [sic] within the
Police Zone, at some places far enough advanced as to aﬀect the styles of dress
peculiar to the Herrero [sic] living in civilization, in other cases they are in the
natural state.58
This quote explicitly mentions South African concerns with clothing as an
indicator of civilization and demonstrates that they had but little historical
insight into what was going on in the Kaokoveld. Though the reports of
Manning and others did refer to the past, it is clear that they did not realize
that a large number of the Herero whom they encountered in the Kaokoveld
were originally from the police zone. These people, in contrast to the
Himba – who, as Oorlog described to oﬃcials, ‘wear long hair and brass
bands on their wrists’ – would have been more familiar and acceptable to the
incoming South African administration.59
Following the Herero–German war, Oorlog welcomed and sheltered a
number of highly skilled Herero who had ﬂed the carnage in central
Namibia. Their skills ranged from gunsmithing to preaching and writing. To
incoming visitors from the police zone, such as Manning and his patrol,
Oorlog would have seemed to be surrounded by people who were ‘familiar ’
to them. Moreover, Oorlog’s followers aﬀected aspects of colonial culture
that had developed in the frontier societies frequented by the Boers.60
57 NAN, ADM 156, General Kaokoland report Major Manning, 7.
58 NAN, SWAA 23, McHugh, 22 July 1926, to Secretary SWA Windhoek.
59 NAN, OCT 17, ‘Notes of an interview’, fo. 2.
60 See in this regard the development of similar traditions among the Griqua and
Oorlam communities in southern and central Namibia and South Africa, as described in
Lau, Namibia. On South Africa proper, see M. C. Legassick, ‘The Northern Frontier to
1820: the emergence of the Griqua people’, in R. Elphick and H. Gilliomee (eds.),
The Shaping of South African Society, 1652–1820 (Cape Town, 1979); N. Penn, Rogues,
Rebels and Runaways: Eighteenth-century Cape Characters (Cape Town, 1999); N. Penn,
The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape’s Northern Frontier in the
18th Century (Cape Town, 2005); R. Ross, Adam Kok’s Griquas: A Study in the
Development of Stratiﬁcation in South Africa (Cambridge, 1976).
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Not only did a number of them speak a form of Afrikaans, they also
had agterryers, servants who helped guard and provision camps, as was
the case with Boer commandos.61 This indicates the deeply stratiﬁed society
that had developed around Oorlog and his followers, a stratiﬁcation that
would have been immediately familiar to Manning and his fellow colonials.
In the rugged and radically diﬀerent wilderness landscape that was
the Kaokoveld, these were people to whom incoming colonial oﬃcials could
relate.
BACKING TOM AND VILIFYING MUHONA KATITI
In reading Manning’s 1917 report, we ﬁnd that one aspect comes to the fore:
Manning’s viliﬁcation of Muhona Katiti. When referring to his expedition,
Manning noted that he had sought to ensure the settlement of a hostile dis-
pute between an ‘Ovathimba headmanMuhona Katiti ’ and ‘a more civilized
half blood Herero headman, Oorlog, who had gone toWindhuk to personally
repudiate charges’.62 In this, Manning neatly summed up what he believed
was the case in the Kaoko: Oorlog was the ‘civilized native’, in contrast to
the ‘savage’ Muhona Katiti. Manning had formed a positive opinion of
Oorlog when he had ﬁrst met him in Windhoek in June 1917 and carried this
positive image into the Kaoko. Everything he saw merely served to reinforce
his initial impressions, and in his reports he consistently compared and
contrasted Oorlog with Muhona Katiti.
In the opening paragraphs of his report ‘Oorlog and Muhona Katiti : his-
tory of and dispute between these chieftains’, Manning did not disguise his
awe of Oorlog.63 In the tired cliche´ used by colonial oﬃcials the world over,
he bestowed high praise on Oorlog, calling him ‘a highly intelligent native’.
Apart from the subjective characterization of Oorlog as a man of good pres-
ence and personality, Manning indicated that Oorlog was associated with the
hunters Green, Andersson, Ericsson, and Hahn, men who would become the
heroes of white Namibian history.64 In so doing, he emphasized that Oorlog
was to be counted not as an e´migre´ from southern Angola but as a person
with a long history of association with and in Namibia.
Neatly dressed in his new South African army uniform, Oorlog had a lot
going for him, partly because he was blessed with such an unusual, if
somewhat dramatic, name that resonated power. It was a name that appealed
to the incoming South African administrators as one that was redolent with
the schoolboy fantasies and ideas so familiar to the young administrators,
most of whom had been educated in theBoys’ Ownworld of boarding schools
61 NAN, SWAA 23, A3/69, Special Police Patrol into Kaokoveld 1925–1926, Sergeant,
South West Police, Karibib, 22 July 1926, to Secretary SWA Windhoek. For more on
agterryers (‘ those who ride behind’), see P. Warwick, Black People and the South African
War, 1899–1902 (Johannesburg, 1983), 11, 25, 26, 130.
62 NAN, ADM 156, Manning Report, 1.
63 NAN, ADM 106, Extract fromGeneral Report of Manning, 1917. Without access to
something likeManning’s personal diaries, there is, of course, no way of knowing whether
Manning was telling his superiors what he believed or what he wanted his superiors to
believe.
64 Tabler, Pioneers.
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in the Cape and Natal.65 Manning’s ﬁrst report on Oorlog emphasized
the meaning of Oorlog’s name as war, and Hahn also never tired of trans-
lating it.66 For the administrators, Oorlog’s name reminded them not merely
of the Herero–Nama wars of the 1860s (and thus of Oorlog’s legitimate
right to settlement in Namibia), but also of the use to which he and his
followers had been put by the Portuguese in Angola, where he had demon-
strated, no fewer than 14 times, his prowess in war and his willingness
and ability to work hand in hand with a colonial administration.67 This
was further proof that Oorlog was willing to assist the colonial state in its
conquest.
By the time Manning and Oorlog moved out of Sesfontein, Manning was
no longer detached from the conﬂict that he was meant to solve. Describing
their joint departure from Sesfontein, Manning noted that he had sent
messages to Muhona Katiti and was ‘taking proper precautions against any
surprise attack by these wild nomadic people [Muhona Katiti’s followers]
who were known to be well armed with riﬂes besides their own weapons’.68
Manning’s description of Muhona Katiti’s followers as ‘wild nomadic peo-
ple’ against whom it was necessary to take precautions was immediately
contrasted with ‘the presence of Oorlog’s well disciplined party which had
been considerably augmented by wandering Ovatshimba people joining him
from the mountains’.69 Muhona Katiti was presented as being all that Oorlog
was not. In contrast to Oorlog – well dressed, riding a horse, and leading a
band of well-disciplined followers – Muhona Katiti is ﬁrst described as
emerging ‘from his adjacent kraal of grass and cow dung huts’.70 Manning’s
opening paragraph on Muhona Katiti, reads as follows:
An Ovatschimba, contemptuous term originally applied only to poorer type of
Kaoko Hereros, obtaining precarious living in mountains without stock or any
ﬁxed abodes. This man about 65 years old and like his people looks a real savage in
sundry metal ornaments, grease, skin girdle, wool or hair bunched and bound with
ﬁne leather behind head.71
In emphasizing the contrast between Oorlog and Katiti, and thus justifying
his decision to support Oorlog in his conﬂict with Katiti, Manning continued
to stress what he considered to be the drawbacks of Muhona and his fol-
lowers. In particular, he suggested that they had no understanding as to what
colonial administration entailed: ‘Owing to the suspicious nature of these
people, their total ignorance of real administration and friction between
parties great care had to be taken to avoid excitement and probable conﬂict ’.72
65 For more on this topic, see, e.g., Morrell, From Boys to Gentlemen ; J. Richards,
‘ ‘‘Boys’ Own Empire’’ : feature ﬁlms and imperialism in the 1930s’, in J. M. Mackenzie
(ed.), ‘Boys ’ Own Empire’: Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester, 1986).
66 NAN, ADM 106, Manning Extract, 1.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid. 5.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid. 2.
72 Ibid. 6.
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The contrast presented by Manning could not have been greater: the regal
leader, Oorlog, and the savage, Muhona Katiti. Having created this dichot-
omy, Manning then proceeded to emphasize Muhona’s subservience to
Oorlog by citing evidence from ‘Oorlog’s statement’.73
The fact that Oorlog and his followers engaged in agriculture was another
aspect brought to the fore by Manning to illustrate Oorlog’s suitability for
oﬃce. The perceived superiority of agricultural and mixed economies to
pastoral ones is well known.74 As men of their time, these sentiments were
shared by Manning and other colonial oﬃcials, and Oorlog was aware of the
moral value that was attached to being involved in agriculture.75 During his
meeting in Windhoek, when seeking to diﬀerentiate his followers from the
original inhabitants of the Kaokoveld, Oorlog commented, ‘we sow mealies
and Kaﬃrcorn. The Otjimbis do not sow. We have Mhango, tobacco and
calabashes also. ’76
Manning’s moral judgment regarding agriculture, and the distinction be-
tween Oorlog and Muhona Katiti, is illustrated by his report of passing,
‘several old cattle posts of Muhona Katiti’s wandering Ovatshimba […] in
this fertile valley, though no attempts at agriculture anywhere’.77 Manning
did not merely present the image of a fertile valley lying fallow but also
attached to this an explicit moral judgement. The fertile valley lay fallow
precisely because ‘Muhona Katiti’s wandering Ovatshimba’ made no at-
tempt at agriculture. The failure of Muhona Katiti’s followers to work the
land was juxtaposed with the activities of the followers of Oorlog: ‘Oorlog’s
settlement […] several parts good for agriculture and being developed by
Oorlog’s people but general rocky and sandy condition country detracts. ’78
To Manning it was clear that, even in the most diﬃcult and adverse of con-
ditions, Oorlog and his followers had engaged in agriculture and were thus
the more civilized.
Manning’s reports cited Muhona Katiti’s conﬂicts with Europeans and
contrasted this with Oorlog’s close cooperation with Europeans and colonial
administrations. Not only had Oorlog assisted the Portuguese authorities
against African opponents (most notably the Kwanyama), but he and his
soldiers had participated in the war against imperial Germany. In the eyes of
Manning and others at the time, Oorlog was considered a natural ally of
the new South African administration, which had also fought against the
73 Ibid. 2.
74 For an introduction to the literature, see J. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, 1998).
75 It is interesting to speculate, given that Oorlog was born and spent his youth in
Otjimbingwe, that he imbibed these sentiments from the Rhenish missionaries stationed
in the settlement. These missionaries, who had ﬁrst established themselves in
Otjimbingwe in the 1850s, continually attempted to turn the migrant pastoralists who
roamed the vicinity into settled agriculturalists. To this end, the missionaries doggedly
attempted to sow and reap crops of wheat in the Swakop riverbed that ran through the
settlement. For a detailed overview of these attempts, see Archives of the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in Namibia, Windhoek, V. Chroniken 25. Otjimbingwe.
76 NAN, OCT 17, ‘Notes of an interview’, 3.
77 NAN, ADM 156, Manning Report, 11.
78 Ibid. 14.
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Kwanyama and the Germans.79 Manning particularly emphasized that the
Portuguese had made extensive use of Oorlog’s prowess to ‘assist them
against rebellious tribes e.g. the Humbe, Omrondo, Evare, Okavango
Ovambos and ﬁnally against Ovakuanyama Chief Mandume’.80 In contrast
to Oorlog, who was presented as having cooperated with ‘Europeans’ and as
having come to Namibia on account of the installation of an English ad-
ministration in the territory, Muhona Katiti was consistently portrayed as
being at odds with Europeans.81 On account of Manning’s depictions of
Muhona Katiti as the foil to Oorlog, future colonial administrators who had
to deal with the Kaoko continued to portray Oorlog as the ‘civilized native’
on the path to enlightenment, and Muhona Katiti as the ‘savage’. By 1926,
Muhona Katiti had ceased to be a person and was portrayed by colonial
administrators as a mere caricature. Thus, in referring to Muhona Katiti in
passing, Hahn noted that Oorlog ‘having come into contact with civilization
much more than Mahona […] is more experienced and much more re-
sourceful than his slow thinking neighbour and in dealings usually has the
upper hand over his resentful rival ’.82
In 1917, as Manning and Oorlog proceeded into the Kaokoveld, Oorlog’s
symbolic power came to be supplemented by more tangible forms.
Manning’s patrol, which was accompanied by Oorlog’s commando, travelled
through the southern reaches of the Kaokoveld and conﬁscated riﬂes and
arms from all those who were not allied to Oorlog. On arriving at Muhona
Katiti’s kraal, the patrol conﬁscated 25 riﬂes and later, after Manning and
Oorlog had moved on, South African patrols conﬁscated a further 70 riﬂes or
so, ‘principally from Muhona Katiti’s wild roving natives’.83
Apart from conﬁscating riﬂes and thereby substantially weakening
Muhona Katiti’s physical powers of coercion, Manning consciously sought
to humiliate Muhona Katiti in the eyes of the inhabitants of the Kaokoveld.
Manning held a hearing in late August 1917 at Muhona Katiti’s kraal in
which:
Under cross examination Muhona Katiti admitted Oorlog had always behaved
justly and that accusations had been recklessly made. In view of trouble and ex-
penditure caused to our Government I gave as my opinion and Lieut. Olivier
concurred, that a ﬁne in stock should be paid. Muhona who expressed regret de-
livered about 37 cattle and 25 sheep. As only a few more riﬂes were produced and it
was suspected that a number were still outstanding we decided to conﬁscate all and
gave Muhona Katiti our reasons. He oﬀered little or no objections saying he only
wanted a peaceful life under Government and would look to Oorlog as his superior
and friend […]84
79 NAN, ADM 106, Manning Extract, 3.
80 Ibid. 1.
81 The presentation of Oorlog’s relations to colonial administration in southern Angola
shortly before his move to Namibia contrasts sharply with the view presented by
Mr. Brodtkorb. NAN, OCT 17, H. Bull Brodtkorb in Namutoni, 30 March 17, to Col. de
Jager, O.C. Troops Windhoek.
82 NAN, SWAA 23, Oﬃcer in Charge, Native Aﬀairs, Ondonga, 20 May 1926, Cocky
Hahn to Secretary for SWA Windhoek, 3.
83 NAN, ADM 106, Manning Extract, 6; and ADM 156, Manning Report, 43.
84 NAN, ADM 106, Manning Extract 7.
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Muhona Katiti was also ordered to hand in further riﬂes to the authorities,
move his settlement closer to Oorlog’s, ‘and to listen to advice of Oorlog
whom we provisionally set up as Foreman subject to Government’s
approval’.85 By the time Manning left the Kaokoveld, Muhona Katiti and
his followers had been reduced to a position where they were subject to
the mercy of Oorlog. In the frank words of Manning, Muhona Katiti and
his followers ‘were scarcely armed at all and quite content to plant ﬁelds
and remain quietly under direction of Oorlog’.86 Manning’s patrol, with its
conﬁscation of Muhona Katiti’s riﬂes and the enforced submission of
Muhona Katiti to Oorlog, had thoroughly undermined Muhona Katiti’s
power.
SOUTH AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION AND IDEAL TYPES
In order to govern the Kaokoveld and its inhabitants, Manning and his
associates created ideal types in their minds that they then sought to enforce
on the ground. Or, as one of them put it:
The natives in the country patrolled appear to fall into two main social groups,
each of which are again in two subdivisions and it is necessary to make these
divisions clear in order that the actual position may be understood.87
The racial thinking of the time ranked white above black, but also sought
to deﬁne ethnic hierarchies of political and social development within
the African population.88 With these racial ideas in mind, South African
administrators governed the Kaokoveld and justiﬁed their actions vis-a`-vis
its inhabitants.
Administrators did not merely create ideal types when dealing with the
population of the Kaokoveld but also sought to shift people and stock in
such a way as to create administrative areas that corresponded with
the models they had created in their heads.89 In 1917, Manning decided
that the best way to ensure the correct enforcement of South African
administration in the Kaokoveld would be through the creation of a ‘broad
uninhabited region between Kaoko and Ovambo’.90 Manning recommended
that the presence of a man of Oorlog’s character and inﬂuence would
have a ‘very beneﬁcial eﬀect in preservation of order and [would] be very
useful for Administrative purposes in that distant locality’.91 On these
grounds, he ‘respectfully suggested that a reserve be provided for [Oorlog]’
and that ‘he be recognised as government headman over Northern
85 Ibid.
86 NAN, ADM 106, Manning extract 8.
87 NAN, SWAA 23, McHugh, 22 July 1926, to Secretary SWA Windhoek.
88 Saul Dubow, Scientiﬁc Racism in Modern South Africa (Cambridge, 1995).
89 For a comparative and eloquently written case see, S. F. Moore, Social Facts and
Fabrications: ‘Customary ’ Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880–1980 (Cambridge, 1986). Rather
less eloquently, J.-B. Gewald, ‘Making tribes: social engineering in theWestern Province
of British administered Eritrea 1941–52’, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, 1 :2
(2000), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_colonialism_and_colonial_history/v001/
1.2gewald.html (consulted 9 February 2011).
90 NAN, ADM 156, Manning Report, 73.
91 Ibid. 35.
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Kaokoveld’.92 Manning’s words sum up the features required by the in-
coming South African administration and which he had found in Oorlog.93
Given Oorlog’s military prowess, it is hardly surprising that the
inhabitants of the Kaokoveld treated him with consideration, tact, and def-
erence. For Manning, these qualities, borne more out of fear than reverence,
were perceived as examples of respect for Oorlog’s leadership qualities,94
a respect that further served to emphasize to the incoming administrators
that Oorlog was the ideal person to be appointed as chief and the govern-
ment’s representative in the Kaokoveld.
COUNTER VIEWS
To all intents and purposes, South African administrators situated Oorlog
as the ideal person for the position but, on occasion, some voiced diﬀerent
views. In early 1926, Sergeant McHugh, who led the second major
South African expedition into the Kaokoveld, accused Oorlog of a number of
misdemeanours and crimes and provided detailed information on how
Oorlog had been engaged in smuggling goods and stock to and from
Ovamboland, harbouring fugitives from justice, smuggling ivory into
Angola, forms of slavery, gunrunning with the Ovambo chiefs Ipumbu and
Martin, and the illicit hunting of game.95 In addition, McHugh indicated
that the tense relationship between Muhona Katiti and Oorlog still existed
and posed a threat to peace and stability in the region. In a four-page
diatribe, Hahn, as oﬃcer in charge of native aﬀairs in Ovamboland, sought to
dismiss these accusations as irrelevant.96
Hahn’s aggressive rebuttal of McHugh’s report is understandable in
light of the role that the incoming South African administration had assigned
to Oorlog. On the basis of Manning’s ﬁndings, Oorlog had been given a
pivotal role in the colonial administration of the Kaokoveld at the expense of
Muhona Katiti. In eﬀect, as a chief in league with the colonial adminis-
tration, he was a creation of Manning’s and was maintained by Hahn. In
addition, through supporting Oorlog, Manning and Hahn had attached their
own reputations to his success. It was the status quo, with Oorlog as the chief
of the Kaokoveld, that was essential to Hahn’s own position as a ‘Lord of
the Last Frontier’.97 It was a status quo, which Hahn anxiously sought to
92 Ibid.
93 Oorlog features in Green’s Lords of the Last Frontier, 75–81, in an extensive de-
scription that is based on Manning’s 1917 tour report.
94 NAN, ADM 106, Manning Extract, 7.
95 NAN, SWAA 23, Report Kaokoveld Patrol, 1925.
96 NAN, SWAA 23, Hahn in Ondonga, 20 May 1926, to Secretary for South West
Africa.
97 Carl Hugo Linsingen Hahn (1886–1948), grandson of Carl Hugo Hahn, the German
missionary who eﬀectively established the Rhenish Mission in central Namibia in the
nineteenth century. The young Hahn, known as ‘Cocky’ by his friends and colleagues,
and Shangolo (‘Whip’) by his subjects, dominated the administration of Ovamboland for
three decades. In 1910 he played for the Springboks, the South African rugby team. In
Namibia, he became particularly known as an administrator, amateur ethnographer, and
photographer. See Gregor Dobler, ‘Traders and trade in colonial Ovamboland,
1925–1990: elite formation and the politics of consumption under indirect rule and
apartheid’ (unpublished Habilitationsschrift, University of Basel, 2010), 47–9.
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preserve, even if this was in the face of contrary evidence provided by other
colonial oﬃcials, such as McHugh.
Given the above, the charges levelled by McHugh could not be accepted
by Hahn, if only because Oorlog was the linchpin in the ma¨nnerphantasie
created by Manning and maintained by Hahn.98 In eﬀect, Oorlog had been
installed with absolute powers. A clear example of this is that Oorlog even
had a licence to kill at will. In 1917, as some people tried to cross into
southern Angola:
Oorlog had sent some men to prohibit this unauthorised emigration and to order
them to come to him and Muhona Katiti, upon which this section of people had
opened ﬁre with a few odd riﬂes on [sic] and wounding one of Oorlog’s messengers
who in defending themselves had killed three of this lot who eventually got away
with some stock into Angola via Swartbooi’s drift.99
In this instance, Manning saw no reason to rebuke Oorlog for the killings and
instead he and his men were praised for having assisted the colonial admin-
istration.
With the tacit support of the colonial administration, Oorlog could, in
eﬀect, do very much as he pleased. This is illustrated by an incident that took
place shortly beforeMcHugh’s visit to the Kaoko in 1925. In 1917, cattle had
been taken from Oorlog and presented to Muhona Katiti in a settlement deal
brokered by Lieutenant Olivier. Six years later, a commando led by Oorlog
attacked Muhona Katiti’s settlement and recaptured these cattle.100 Though
Muhona Katiti tried to report the attack, the correspondence related to the
case indicates that his complaints were not taken seriously. Hahn, as native
administrator, dismissedMuhona Katiti’s claim, noting that: ‘Mahona-kititi
[…] would only be too keen to report happenings in Oorlog’s country or
adjoining areas, since he regards the latter, not exactly as an enemy, but
with extreme suspicion and jealousy. ’101 Hahn’s words indicate that Oorlog,
as the man who ﬁt the ideal created by the administrators, was to receive a
favourable hearing from the self-same administrators, whereas Muhona
Katiti was consistently denied a fair hearing. His position, as Hahn saw it,
was little more than that of an informer.
In contrast to Hahn, McHugh maintained a diﬀerent opinion of Muhona
Katiti. When reporting on his relationship with the chief, McHugh wrote
that Muhona Katiti ‘was very friendly, during the whole period the patrol
remained in his country, it is believed that he will assist the Police in every
way, he was rather disappointed to learn that more police were not coming
up’.102 The permanent presence of police was something that Muhona Katiti
would have appreciated, if only because it meant that they could keep a check
on Oorlog. In later years, as McHugh’s report suggests, Muhona Katiti and
98 I refer here to the work by Klaus Theweleit on fascist consciousness and bodily
experience: K. Theweleit, Male Fantasies, Vol I and Vol II, trans. E. Carter and
C. Turner (Minneapolis, 1989).
99 NAN, ADM 106, Manning Extract, 8–9.
100 NAN, SWAA 23, Report Kaokoveld Patrol, 1925, 15.
101 NAN, SWAA 23, Oﬃcer in Charge, Native Aﬀairs, Ondonga, 20 May 1926, Cocky
Hahn to Secretary for SWA Windhoek, 2.
102 NAN, SWAA 23, Report Kaokoveld Patrol, 1925, 16.
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his followers saw the South African administration oﬃcials as a third force
operating independently of, and in time at variance with, Oorlog.
It could be argued that, when Manning moved into the Kaokoveld with
Oorlog in 1917, many of the Kaokoveld inhabitants saw Oorlog, not
Manning, as the expedition’s leader. In 1917, Oorlog was eﬀectively the ruler
by conquest of the Kaokoveld and, as Brodtkorb’s words of warning sug-
gested, Manning was only able to operate in the Kaokoveld in cooperation
with him.103 For the people of the Kaokoveld, Oorlog had moved into their
territory from southern Angola where he had built up a fearsome reputation
as a warlord. After coming into conﬂict with Muhona Katiti, Oorlog trav-
elled to Windhoek and returned accompanied by a heavily armed patrol of
South African soldiers, dressed in uniforms that were indistinguishable from
the new uniforms being worn by Oorlog and his lieutenants. After this,
Oorlog proceeded to move through the Kaokoveld disarming all his op-
ponents.
In their dealings with Manning, Oorlog and his followers sought to deploy
a language of comradeship that evoked manly camaraderie and parity. In
accordance with Afrikaner trek Boer tradition, in which men of the same age
refer to one another as ‘Boet’ (derived from the Dutch word Broeder mean-
ing brother), male members of Oorlog’s following referred to one another
as ‘Boetie’. In his 1917 expedition report, Manning noted with pleasure that
a headman named Weripaka ‘already addresses [Oorlog] as ‘‘Boetie’’ [a]
customary term employed amongst [the] latter’s followers’.104 To help
Manning better understand the Kaokoveld, Oorlog assigned a number
of men to accompany Manning’s patrol who, when speaking to him, also
addressed him as ‘Boetie’.105
CONCLUSION
Michael Crowder, writing about West Africa, commented on the problems
that faced ‘colonial conquistadors’ attempting to establish administrations
in the territories they claimed. ‘In the ﬁrst place’, he noted, ‘ they were
largely ignorant of the nature of the societies they were about to govern’. In
addition, ‘the administrations imposed […] were necessarily ad hoc and
greatly inﬂuenced by the personality of the man imposing them’.106
Crowder’s words are equally apt for the Kaokoveld, where the personalities
not only of the ‘colonial conquistadors’ – Manning and Hahn – but also of
the ‘conquered’ – Oorlog – were of crucial importance.
In the case of the Kaoko, the bulk of the information available to Manning
and Hahn came from Oorlog. The ‘colonial conquistadors’, although
they sought to portray another image of themselves in their formal
103 Brodtkorb was the Norwegian trader and hunter who had fought in joint com-
mandos with Oorlog in southern Angola, and who had provided the incoming South
Africans with their ﬁrst detailed reports on Oorlog. Brodtkorb urged the South African
military to negotiate and warned that ‘If Oorlog sees a big force coming up, he will
probably ﬁght and will have good chances in the mountains and passes’. NAN, OCT 17,
H. Bull Brodtkorb in Namutoni, 30 March 17, to Col. de Jager, O.C. Troops Windhoek.
104 NAN, ADM 156, Manning Report, 22.
105 Ibid. 25.
106 M. Crowder, West Africa under Colonial Rule (London, 1968), 165.
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correspondence, were dependent on him. Having elevated Oorlog to a
position of power, it was imperative for Manning and Hahn to support him
both in the interests of the conquest state and also in the interests of their
own careers within the colonial administration. That is, though Oorlog’s
failings were probably apparent to Manning and Hahn, as part of eﬀorts to
aid their own careers and reputations as well as the success of the conquest,
those failings could be overlooked.
Oorlog’s willingness to cooperate with the South African administration,
even though it was clear that he was responsible for the death of numerous
opponents, did not harm his standing with Manning and Hahn, and by
extension the colonial administration. If anything, his willingness to inter-
vene actively and exercise his power appealed to the conquest state. Yet, a
few years later, as Rizzo’s work has detailed, the interests of the South
African administration had shifted away from rule based on these inter-
personal relations, and the disappearance of a single witness could be used to
remove Oorlog from power.107
Central to Oorlog’s colonial success in the Kaoko was his ability to
mould and inﬂuence the interpersonal relationships that he developed with
representatives of the South African colonial administration. The import-
ance of these relationships in the establishment and maintenance of colonial
rule in Africa is generally overlooked in favour of broad brushstroke history
that subsumes the importance of individuals to structural processes.108 The
signiﬁcance of the relationships that Oorlog developed with Manning and
later Hahn, based on mutual admiration and shared visions of masculine
power, should not be underestimated. Although these personal relations and
notions of masculinity may not have deﬁned the structures of the conquest
state, they did determine who would be chief. Thus, at the furthest reaches of
South African rule, the interpersonal was paramount.
107 As Rizzo aptly noted, ‘the administration tended to support the headmen’s exercise
of power and application of controlled violence against their subjects, as long as it re-
mained useful to the general colonial project ’ (Rizzo, ‘The elephant shooting’, 260).
108 For a comparative approach that recognizes the importance of the individual, see
Baz Lecocq, ‘That Desert is Our Country ’: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms
in Contemporary Mali (1946–1996) (Amsterdam, 2002), 28–9.
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